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Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957 in order to promote safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear technologies to the betterment of mankind. One of the main goals of the IAEA is to safeguard nuclear material from diversion into non-peaceful uses and thus prevent nuclear proliferation. There are 187 signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and all non-nuclear weapon state parties must conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As the number of nuclear facilities and volume of nuclear material grows, so does the extent of safeguards. While safeguards activities have grown significantly over the 50 year course of the IAEA, the safeguards budget has not grown at the same rate. Also, a zero real growth safeguards budget scenario is predicted for the future, despite expected increased demand for safeguards activities throughout the world.
This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclearweapons states' (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.
Safeguarded Facilities and Nuclear Material 1970 to Present
In 1970 Figure 1 . The most dramatic increase occurred in the 1970s, followed by a gradual increase until the late 1990s. The 2000s have not seen an increase in the number of safeguarded facilities thus far; however, many countries have plants currently under construction or planned that will consume safeguards resources in the very near future. It is important to note that some facilities consume higher levels of safeguards resources than others. For example, light water power reactors (LWRs) are generally simpler to apply safeguards to than heavy water power reactors (HWRs) because LWRs use large fuel assemblies that are replaced during specific outage periods when the reactor is shutdown, while HWRs use smaller fuel assemblies than can be replaced while the reactor is online, thus making it difficult to achieve safeguards objectives in a timely fashion, and also offer additional diversion paths which must be addressed through the safeguards approach. Conversion and enrichment facilities also consume significant safeguards resources because they process material in bulk form, and enrichment plants present challenges in protecting against all diversion or misuse scenarios. Some LEU fuel fabrication plants and most storage facilities allow item accounting methods to dominate the safeguards approach, which also can facilitate the use of short-notice random inspections. Reprocessing plants separate plutonium and uranium from spent fuel and thus have a high potential for diversion or misuse, and pose challenges related to timeliness and meeting detection objectives due to large throughputs and measurement uncertainties. Research facilities use relatively much smaller amounts of nuclear material than commercial facilities, but still require application of safeguards and careful monitoring of a dynamic design-information environment. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Correlating to the increase in the number of safeguarded facilities over time, the amount of safeguarded nuclear material has also dramatically increased. To sustain operating nuclear power plants, uranium must be mined, milled, converted, usually enriched, and fabricated into fuel. All of this material entering safeguarded facilities is then also monitored under safeguards, thus constantly increasing the amount of nuclear material under safeguards. Far less material is removed from safeguards (as waste, for example) than is introduced into the fuel cycle. Nuclear material usually enters safeguards at a conversion facility, before entering an enrichment or fuel fabrication plant.
While commercial uranium for nuclear power plants is low enriched (LEU), high enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are sometimes used in research reactors and other research facilities around the world. The IAEA has designated the amount of a certain type of nuclear material that would be needed to make a nuclear weapon as a significant quantity (SQ) of material. A significant quantity of LEU is 75 kg, but only 8 kg for plutonium and 25 kg for HEU, calculated in the total of the isotope U-235 or element Pu contained.
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The significant increase of safeguarded material over time is shown in Figure 2 . In 1970 there were 447 SQs of material under IAEA safeguards. There are currently 151,749 safeguarded SQs, a more than 300 fold increase in only 40 years. Since nuclear material will continue to accumulate, there is estimated to be an increasing trend of safeguarded material in the future as current power plants continue to operate and new ones are built. 
Evolution in Safeguards Activities Over Time
Significant events have caused the safeguards regime of the IAEA to reorganize and strengthen. In 1991, Iraq was found to be in violation of its safeguards agreement, for pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. South Africa signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as NNWS in 1991 but later revealed that the country had dismantled a nuclear weapons program just prior to acceding to the NPT. By 1994, after 3 years of inspections, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa had dismantled their weapons program. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first announced that they would withdraw from the NPT in 1993 followed by international suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, and negotiated agreements to contain and monitor the plutonium production reactor and spent fuel. The DPRK officially withdrew from the NPT in 2003, becoming the first state ever to do so (and its withdrawal has not been accepted by the NPT States party due to procedural oversights). These events prompted the IAEA to compose the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Safeguards Agreements, which provided the IAEA with additional access to information, locations and technical verification measures to aid in the discovery of indicators of undeclared nuclear activities. helps the IAEA to look for undeclared nuclear material or activities. The AP has given the IAEA more access but has also expanded the safeguards system and introduced new resource intensive activities which take place both in Vienna and in the field. Safeguards under the AP include use of short-notice random inspections, unattended remote monitoring, access to all locations on every nuclear site, all locations provided in the expanded declaration, the increased collection of environmental samples, along with other measures. 4 These activities give the IAEA more responsibility (reaching conclusions about the absence of indicators of undeclared activities in a state) and thus a greater scope of work for its employees.
There are currently 71 states with safeguarded nuclear activities.
5 Figure 3 shows the breakdown of the AP status for these 71 states. A state with comprehensive safeguards has not yet signed the AP. Once it is signed, the state composes a declaration of all nuclear-related activities and provides it to the IAEA, which is then evaluated for consistency with other information available to the IAEA. Once the AP is put into force, the IAEA takes extra effort to verify that all nuclear activities are declared and remain in peaceful uses. Once this broader conclusion is reached, the state has entered into "integrated safeguards." As of 2009, 18 states have put the AP into force but have not yet reached the broader conclusion. The IAEA must undergo extra effort to verify the nuclear activities of these states. Additionally, 10 more states have signed the AP and plan to put it into force in the near future. In 2007, there were also a significant number of facilities in states with the AP signed or in force but not yet under integrated safeguards. Figure 4 shows the break down of the number of facilities by the AP status of each state. The AP was first signed in 1997 and grew to having a majority of nuclear facilities under integrated safeguards within 10 years. However, it can be seen that this transformation from comprehensive to integrated safeguards has had an impact on on the IAEA safeguards budget. 
Future Projection of Safeguarded Facilities and Nuclear Material
As the demand for electricity increases in both industrialized and developing nations, many countries are looking into creating or expanding their nuclear energy infrastructure. Nuclear Association provides information on countries that have new plants under construction or are planning to build more in the future. Assuming that all plans for power plants succeed and that safeguards activities begin as the plants are put online (in reality, they begin much earlier), a projection is made of how many plants in NNWS will be eligible for safeguards through 2030. This projection includes existing plants in India that are eligible and expected to be under IAEA safeguards in the near future. It is assumed that all existing plants remain under safeguards (which they usually do, even after being decommissioned) or that the state replaces lost nuclear capacity with a new nuclear plant. Figure 5 shows that the number of plants will more than double in about 20 years. There will also be nearly twice as many HWR plants, which, as mentioned before, take more effort to safeguard due to the heightened possibility of diversion of nuclear material. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 In order to support the expansion of nuclear power, new fuel cycle facilities will also add to the number of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards in the future. The nuclear weapons states (NWS) are heavily planning to upgrade current plants and build new conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication plants to match the world-wide expansion of nuclear power.
12 Therefore, a list of current and planned facilities in NNWS eligible for IAEA safeguards is used for future projections, as shown in Table 1 . An operation date of 2030 is assumed as the latest if no other information is given. Pakistan is included in these projections because it has the potential to be under safeguards. Also, there have been no new plans to built reprocessing plants by NNWS. These facilities 13 , along with the projected number of plants in Figure 5 are combined to show the total growth in number of safeguarded facilities from 1970 to 2030 in Figure 6 . Once again, the number of facilities under IAEA safeguards is expected to double in the next 20 years. In order to estimate the amount of nuclear material that will be under IAEA safeguards to support the growing nuclear industry, a projection of the nuclear energy electric capacity must be estimated. While documenting the planned power plants from the World Nuclear Association, the planned capacity was also calculated. If there was no planned capacity available, then it was assumed that each new unit in a plant would be 1 GWe capacity for LWRs and 500 MWe capacity for HWRs, which are rough average capacities for the new LWR and HWR plants being constructed. This information was then used to create Figure 7 , which expands the projected capacity from the current nuclear capacity under safeguards. The nuclear capacity for safeguarded power plants is expected to nearly triple. 21, 22 With the projected capacities of nuclear power in Figure 7 , the amount of nuclear material to support it can now be calculated. 245 tons of yellow cake is needed per year to supply the fuel for 1 GWe capacity of a nuclear reactor, which is equal to 208 tons of the element uranium.
23 Table 2 shows the assumed parameters for SQs and concentrations of U-235 and Pu at the various points in the fuel cycle. Table 3 shows the SQs per 1 GWe capacity of LWR and HWR plants used in the once-through fuel cycle. It is assumed that eventually all nuclear material under safeguards in the fuel cycle will result as the U-235 in tails from conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication or as U-235 and Pu in spent fuel. As seen in Table 3 estimated to almost triple in 20 years. Also, the projected numbers do not include fissile material that will be needed for research facilities in the future. 
Safeguards Budget
While the IAEA safeguards budget has significantly increased since 1970, the IAEA has expressed concern that its budget may experience zero real growth over the foreseeable future. Using the data from Figure 8 and Figure 9 , a timeline of safeguards budget per significant quantity of material is composed. Figure 10 shows that there has been an extreme decline in the safeguards budget available per significant quantity of material under safeguards. The relation is only expected to decline to under $300 per SQ by 2030. A zero real growth budget for IAEA safeguards will not be sufficient to safeguard the future nuclear material needed to sustain the growing nuclear power demand. 
Safeguards Budget per Significant Quanitity of Material Under Safeguards

Conclusion
The IAEA plays a crucial role in international nuclear security by safeguarding fissile material from diversion into non-peaceful uses. The scope of work of the IAEA has increased dramatically over its 50 year life due to increasing nuclear infrastructure and responding to the threat of clandestine nuclear weapons programs. There are currently 71 states with safeguarded nuclear activities, 18 of which are being inspected to reach the broader conclusion and achieve integrated safeguards. The majority of safeguarded nuclear facilities are now under integrated safeguards since the AP was first signed in 1997.
Since nuclear power is an attractive option to meet electric energy needs for both industrialized and developing countries, the safeguards scope of the IAEA is expected to increase rapidly in the coming years. The number of new nuclear power plants in NNWS will more than double by 2030, including a large increase in HWR plants, which are a greater proliferation concern. The total number of nuclear facilities eligible for safeguards will also nearly triple in the next 20 years. The nuclear electric capacity from these new plants will nearly triple the nuclear capacity under safeguards to about 425 GWe. As a result, the significant quantities of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards is expected to nearly triple by 2030 just from the material needed to sustain the new and existing power plants.
The IAEA safeguards budget is expected to see zero real growth in the near future. This would cause the budget to decline to under $300 per SQ by 2030. As new nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities are constructed in NNWS, more and more nuclear material will need to be safeguarded by the IAEA. An increase in budget will be necessary for the future of international safeguards and nuclear security. This report has not evaluated the affect of added missions to the IAEA, but if they were to be asked to verify a new treaty or convention, such as a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or a Disarmament agreement, the budget pressures would worsen. Sendai-shi, Kagoshima-ken Shika-1
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